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Introduction
Currently, more than one-third of adults in the United States are 
consuming news on the world’s largest social network, 
Facebook (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & 
Nielsen, 2017). This makes the platform a prime engagement 
tool for news organizations to publish news stories and allows 
users to comment on those stories. Essentially, news organiza-
tions hope to engage with their readers through their comment 
sections on Facebook and to drive traffic to their own websites. 
While social media was initially praised for providing a plat-
form for public discourse, user comments on social media 
often contain high levels of negative emotions, incivility, and 
antipolitical rhetoric (Anderson et al., 2014; Ceron, 2015; 
Muddiman & Stroud, 2017; Rowe, 2015b). Particularly when 
political topics are discussed on social media, negative emo-
tions seem to thrive (Trilling, 2014; Ziegele, Quiring, et al., 
2018). Commenting on political news represents an engage-
ment with journalistic content that is important to analyze, as 
these comments may reveal the opinions of those who are will-
ing to engage in public debates and attempt to influence public 
opinion (Buckels et al., 2014).
In addition, research in political communication has 
pointed out the potentially detrimental impact of negative 
emotions, cynicism, and incivility in political discourse and 
electoral politics (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). However, 
negativity in comments is not inevitably challenging online 
discourses. While passionate disagreement is considered a 
deliberative opportunity for online communication, it is hos-
tility, including anger, contempt, disgust, frustration, and 
hate, that violates the norms of deliberative conversations 
(Oz et al., 2018). Hostile emotions include the direct or indi-
rect attribution to another person of negative or blameworthy 
features (D’Errico & Poggi, 2013). In online conversations, 
hostile emotions function as strong partisan identifiers 
(Miller & Conover, 2015). Partisans behave like sports team 
fans who strive “to preserve the status of their teams rather 
than [being] thoughtful citizens participating in the political 
process for the broader good” (Miller & Conover, 2015, 
p. 225), and express hostile emotions. It has been argued that 
hostility undermines the preconditions for deliberation 
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because it limits personal freedoms, promotes stereotypes, 
disrespects opposing views, and threatens democracy 
(Hwang et al., 2018; Popan et al., 2019). Moreover, an envi-
ronment of hostile comments triggers more hostile com-
ments, which creates a downward spiral regarding comment 
hostility over time (Cheng et al., 2015). This makes hostility 
a particularly important research area of online debates 
because hostile emotions potentially promote harmful and 
aggressive behaviors as they feature medium to high arousal 
that can progressively increase (D’Errico & Paciello, 2018).
While previous research has analyzed drivers of hostile 
comments on news on the content level (D’Errico & Paciello, 
2018; Ziegele, Quiring, et al., 2018), not much is known 
regarding the influence of the macro- and meso-level con-
texts on hostile emotions in online comments. However, pat-
terns of discussion among readers vary depending on the 
country they live in (Walter et al., 2018). In this article, we 
therefore examine the prevalence of hostile emotions in user 
comments—including anger, contempt, disgust, frustration, 
and hate—and relate the sentiment of comments to the senti-
ment of news posts of six news outlets in two different coun-
tries, namely, Germany and the United States. We focus on 
Facebook due to its wide reach and heterogeneous readership 
and compare news outlets with varying political leanings and 
degrees of market orientation (mass-market, up-market, and 
alternative right-wing). We argue that political leaning and 
market orientation of news outlets as well as country differ-
ences, such as different levels of audience polarization, can 
impact the extent of hostile emotions in user comments. 
Therefore, we follow the social informatics perspective that 
explains social consequences of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs) based on cultural and institutional 
contexts (Kling, 2000). In contrast to technological deter-
minism, the social informatics perspective suggests that ICTs 
have different outcomes when introduced to different cicum-
stances. That is, ICT’s social consequences, such as the 
knowledge-building capacity of communication on social 
media, depend on the the meso- and macro-level contexts of 
technology use (Greyson, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
This study is therefore the first to shed light on factors at 
the national and organizational levels that potentially foster 
hostile emotions in user comments and thus emphasizes that 
the micro-level as well as the meso- and macro-level con-
texts are relevant when analyzing interdependencies between 
people and technology.
Literature Review
News Content as Micro-Level Driver of Hostile 
Emotions in User Comments
D’Errico and Paciello (2018) reveal that user comments 
that contain annoyance, irritation, and contempt, that is, 
aspects of hostility, are related to antisocial opinions that 
manifest in blame attribution or dehumanization of victims. 
Thus, impoliteness, incivility, and hostility are closely 
related (Naab et al., 2018; Oz et al., 2018). Building on this 
literature, we conceptualize hostile emotions in user com-
ments as impolite emotional expressions that aim at insult-
ing individuals or social groups. This definition combines 
aspects of impoliteness and incivility to determine an 
unconstructive and extremely negative sentiment in user 
comments. Emotional components of hostile user com-
ments include anger, contempt, disgust, frustration, and 
hate (Oz et al., 2018; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Soroka et al., 
2015).
On a micro-level, the type of news content explains vary-
ing levels of hostile user comments (Oz et al., 2018; Rowe, 
2015a; Sydnor, 2018). News coverage on controversial top-
ics, such as immigration or public policy, is often followed 
by high numbers of user comments, among them often those 
including hostile emotions (Farkas et al., 2018; Oz et al., 
2018). News outlets might provoke hostile comments on 
their Facebook pages by posting articles that contain nega-
tive emotions or scandals. Negativity is an important news 
factor as well as a discussion factor (Weber, 2014). By favor-
ing dramatic, conflict-emphasizing news reporting, news 
outlets might generate follow-up communication reflecting 
their negative tone (Soroka et al., 2015). Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis:
H1. Higher levels of negative emotions in posts trigger 
higher levels of hostile emotions in user comments.
Moreover, hostility as an emotional expression is usually 
targeted toward a specific group or actor, and commenters 
frequently attack certain actors, such as immigrants, the 
media, or the political elites (Coe et al., 2014). Meanwhile, 
populist movements often rely on such negative emotions as 
a key strategy for their continuous support (Blassnig, 
Engesser, et al., 2019; Rico et al., 2017). We therefore pose 
the following hypothesis:
H2. Comments referring to immigrants, the media, or 
political class contain higher levels of hostile emotions 
compared to other comments.
However, content alone may not be sufficient to explain 
different levels of hostility in user comments across news 
outlets and media systems.
Drivers at the Organizational Level: Market 
Orientation and Political Stance
Previous research found that the level of incivility in com-
ments differs across news outlets (Ziegele, Quiring, et al., 
2018). Two aspects may cause news outlets to accept or trig-
ger deviant comments, including hostile emotions in com-
ments: the market orientation and the position of an extreme 
political leaning.
Humprecht et al. 3
News outlets have been found to differ in the degree to 
which they strive to maximize their reach and revenue 
(Benson, 2016; Humprecht & Esser, 2018). The market ori-
entation of some media types is reflected not only in the 
news content they produce, but also in the comments they 
moderate or allow (Benson et al., 2018; Blassnig, Engesser, 
et al., 2019; Walter et al., 2018). Previous research has high-
lighted the differences between mass-market and up-market 
media companies in terms of market orientation and its 
impact on news production (Dunaway, 2013; Humprecht & 
Esser, 2018).
Most news organizations run their own Facebook pages, 
but the purpose of these pages is often simply to increase 
readership (Rowe, 2015b). Therefore, news making for 
social media adapts to the logics of social networks, and edi-
tors are more likely to select news stories that have the 
potential to be popular and trigger engagement (van Dijck & 
Poell, 2013). Provocative, negative comments may serve as 
a means to increase the popularity of and engagement with 
an article. Although media companies often complain about 
negative emotions in user comments, they tolerate them 
(Cheng et al., 2015) because such comments attract audi-
ences (Muddiman & Stroud, 2017; Rowe, 2015a), trigger 
attention, and broaden the reach of news stories (Weber, 
2014; Ziegele, Weber, et al., 2018).
When professional norms are subordinated by financial 
goals, market orientation is likely to be reflected in the mod-
eration of user comments (Weber, 2014). Previous research 
has shown that news outlets employ various strategies to 
manage comment sections (Ksiazek, 2015). Interestingly, 
news outlets’ pre- and post-moderation strategies have been 
found to differ between their websites and Facebook pages 
(Naab et al., 2018; Rowe, 2015b). On their own websites, 
outlets often have guidelines for commenters and might even 
suspend users who do not comply with these rules. On 
Facebook, however, other rules seem to apply. The rules on 
Facebook are often not made explicit and are, in many cases, 
less strict (Hille & Bakker, 2014). This lax handling of devi-
ant commenting on Facebook pages is likely to be driven by 
the aim to increase audience reach and thus may differ across 
news outlets depending on their goal to maximize reach 
(Carlson, 2018). Hence, while mass-market outlets target a 
broad audience and are often highly market-oriented 
(Humprecht & Esser, 2018), up-market outlets often have 
distinct professional standards and are less mass-market-
oriented (Benson et al., 2018). Therefore, we assume the 
following:
H3. Facebook pages of mass-market outlets contain 
higher numbers of hostile emotions in user comments 
compared to up-market outlets.
Recent research has shown that populist actors deliber-
ately fuel negative emotions to crystallize grievances, often 
toward political elites or immigrants (Hameleers et al., 2017; 
Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). 
Alternative right-wing media news outlets use this commu-
nication strategy to frame issues in a way that confirms these 
ideological predispositions (Heft et al., 2019; Krämer, 2017). 
This type of news content is found to trigger hostile emotions 
in user comments (Coe et al., 2014; Esau et al., 2017). 
Moreover, certain journalistic styles foster negative emo-
tions and outrages in comment sections. Sobieraj and Berry 
(2011) found that overgeneralizations, sensationalism, mis-
leading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem 
attacks, and partial truths about opponents lead to those out-
rages. The employment of certain frames and styles depends 
on the political positioning of news outlets. Research has 
shown that conservative media utilize significantly more 
outrage speech than liberal media (Bessi et al., 2015). 
Regarding political stance, Republicans are regarded as 
ruder than Democrats in the United States, suggesting that 
commenting styles differ depending on the political leaning 
of a news outlet’s audience (Gastil, 2019). However, these 
findings are mostly limited to the political context of single 
countries, focusing on the United States, and have not been 
validated in a comparative setting. It is thus crucial to under-
stand whether certain strategies of news outlets lead to dif-
ferent outcomes across different countries. Based on these 
findings, we suggest the following:
H4. Facebook pages of alternative right-wing news out-
lets contain higher levels of hostile user comments com-
pared to mass-market and up-market news outlets.
Drivers at the System Level: Polarization of 
Online Discourses
Previous research has established that different information 
environments, such as in the United States and Germany, 
shape public discourse, which might also be true for online 
discussions (Esser et al., 2012; Ferree et al., 2002; Gerhards 
& Schäfer, 2010) and commenting behavior (Sherrick & 
Hoewe, 2018). Recent developments such as the rise of 
populist parties and growing societal and political polariza-
tion (Barnidge et al., 2018; Esser et al., 2017) can explain 
important dynamics of user comments’ expression. In 
Germany as well as in the United States, right-wing popu-
lism is a relatively new phenomenon (Norris, 2005; van 
Kessel, 2015). However, while the United States is cur-
rently governed by a populist political leader, the German 
populist party is not able to dominate public discourse to 
the same degree President Trump does in the United States 
(Blassnig, Rodi, & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2019; Timbro, 
2019). Moreover, a growing polarization among political 
elites and the public is arguably being reflected in public 
discourse (Kenski et al., 2018; Layman et al., 2006) and in 
specific news media diets of populist users (Schulz, 2019). 
In this line, recent research has shown that audience polar-
ization has increased in some countries (Fletcher et al., 
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2020). This research shows that audiences in the United 
States are more polarized compared to Germany where 
major news outlets attract audiences from different sides of 
the political spectrum. In highly polarized countries like the 
United States, frequently used news outlets have strongly 
left-leaning or strongly right-leaning audiences, while out-
lets with mostly mixed or centrist audiences become less 
important (Fletcher et al., 2020).
Against this background, we argue that the polarization 
of audiences is reflected in public discussions on 
Facebook. Previous research has shown that hostile emo-
tions and antipolitical rhetoric seem to flourish on social 
media (Ceron, 2015; Ferrara et al., 2016; Muddiman & 
Stroud, 2017; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Exposure to this 
kind of rhetoric, in turn, shapes expectations of public 
deliberation (Hwang et al., 2014; Stroud, 2011). Moreover, 
the unmanageable amount of information sources on the 
web can lead to selective exposure of content that is con-
sistent with one’s own beliefs or the avoidance of news 
(Aalberg et al., 2013; Iyengar et al., 2009; Stromback 
et al., 2012). However, some studies indicate that the 
social media environment also enhances exposure to 
inconsistent information, that is, when information is 
shared by friends. For example, Filer and Fredheim (2016) 
found in their study of Twitter discourses in Argentina and 
Russia that political actors did not shut down opposition 
discourse, but tried to undermine it with their own fram-
ing of certain events. This interplay between political 
antagonists may explain the polarization of controversies 
in digital societies (Post, 2019). Thus, exposure to incon-
sistent information does not necessarily add to a more bal-
anced world view. In contrast, readers may reject 
unpleasant information and use comments sections to 
share their negative emotions. These negative comments, 
in turn, make readers with similar views feel affirmed 
(Sherrick & Hoewe, 2018). In environments with strong 
audience polarization, user comments are likely to be stra-
tegically hostile to defend partisan views and offend the 
counter party (Miller & Conover, 2015). Hence, audience 
polarization and hostility in online discourses are closely 
related. However, empirical evidence regarding the 
increasing audience polarization and declining delibera-
tive quality of online discussions is inconclusive, and 
most studies focused on the United States (Oz et al., 2018; 
Rowe, 2015b; Wang & Silva, 2018).
The United States and Germany offer excellent conditions 
for comparative research because both countries—to differ-
ent extents—have been impacted by political parties and 
leadership of the far-right (e.g., President Trump in the 
United States and the rise of the Alternative for Germany 
[AfD] far-right party). In addition, research has shown that 
audience polarization is more pronounced in the United 
States compared to Germany (Fletcher et al., 2020). 
Summarizing the findings discussed above, we conclude that 
substantial differences exist between the United States and 
Germany regarding the hostility in online discourses. Thus, 
we hypothesize the following:
H5. Facebook pages of US-based news outlets contain 
higher levels of hostile emotions in user comments com-
pared to the Facebook pages of German-based news 
outlets.
Finally, cross-national research has established that the 
national context shapes public deliberation (Ferree et al., 
2002). However, empirical studies have not yet examined 
how characteristics of different political and media systems 
shape user comments. Thus, we pose the following research 
question:
RQ1. How does the country interact with outlet-level and 
content-level characteristics?
Data and Methods
To assess the hypotheses, a quantitative content analysis 
was performed. The sampling was conducted in three 
steps. First, two countries with different levels of audience 
polarization were sampled, namely, Germany and the 
United States. Previous research has established that audi-
ences in the United States are highly polarized compared 
to Germany (Fletcher et al., 2020). One reason for this is 
that Germany and the United States have different media 
systems. Germany has been considered part of the demo-
cratic corporatist media systems model, characterized by 
low levels of political parallelism and media-party paral-
lelism (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Büchel et al., 2016; 
Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Moreover, the country has a 
strong public broadcasting system with a diverse audience, 
also in terms of political orientation (Fletcher et al., 2020). 
The United States, in contrast, is characterized by strong 
audience polarization, a finding that has been linked to the 
country’s increasing polarization of political elites which 
is reflected in news reporting as well as in audience orien-
tation (Fletcher et al., 2020).
In a second step, we sampled news outlets with different 
degrees of market orientation and different political leanings. 
This distinction helped us to sample functional equivalent 
media organizations across both political and media systems. 
Based on the categorizations of media types used in previous 
research (Blassnig, Engesser, et al., 2019; Ernst et al., 2019), 
we sampled news outlets with the highest number of follow-
ers in each category. Following Ernst et al. (2019), we sam-
pled one mass-market news outlet in each country, namely, 
USA Today and WAZ, one up-market news outlet in each 
country, namely New York Times and Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
and one alternative right-wing news outlet in each country 
(Breitbart and Kopp Report) (Table 1). This categorization is 
based on the assumption that some news outlets follow more 
professional criteria in their editorial work (e.g., up-market 
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outlets), while others are rather guided by profit orientation 
(e.g., mass-market outlets).1
Third, we identified the news outlets’ official Facebook 
pages and collected 244,562 user comments and their origi-
nal posts (n = 1,438) within 1 week in February 2017. We 
then randomly sampled 300 comments on each Facebook 
page, summing up to N = 1,800 comments. The coding was 
conducted by two native speakers who underwent several 
rounds of coder training until the intercoder reliability test 
achieved satisfying results, with average Krippendorff’s 
alpha values of .79 (>.65; <.85).
The sentiment of each comment was operationalized by 
coding the manifest tonality of each comment in the respec-
tive language (English or German). Drawing on previous 
research (Oz et al., 2018), a hostile sentiment was indicated 
by use of expressions of anger (e.g., “That’s an insult.”), 
offensive contempt (e.g., “delusional narcissist sociopath”), 
disgust (e.g., “pathetic embarrassment”), frustration (e.g., 
“They screwed us!”), and hate (e.g., “I hate everything about 
him! EVERYTHING”). In contrast, an affirmative, positive 
tone was indicated by cheering or approving expressions, 
such as “great,” “well done,” “I love it,” “I support it,” or 
“okay.” For the subsequent data analysis, the various forms 
of hostile emotions were combined into a hostile emotions 
index.
Furthermore, we coded the main actor of each comment. 
We coded the most important political and societal actors, for 
example, heads of state, political parties in congress, news 
media, and different societal groups. Actors were assigned to 
the following categories: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, 
Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Republican Party (US), 
Democratic Party (US), CDU/CSU (DE), SPD (DE), Die 
Grünen (DE), Die Linke (DE), AfD (DE), other politicians, 
politics/political class, business/economics, media/journal-
ism, immigrants/foreigners, general public, and other actors. 
Furthermore, we coded the target object of each comment. 
Target objects were coded if a comment attacked, defamed, 
or offended an actor. We used the same actor list that was 
used for the coding of main actors.
In the last step we turned to the n = 1,438 news posts that 
belonged to the comments. To analyze the large number of 
posts, we opted for an automated analysis using the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). LIWC is a psychological 
dictionary that allows us to analyze the emotional tone of the 
news outlet’s Facebook posts (Pennebaker et al., 2007). The 
LIWC dictionary contains lists of words and word stems 
linked to a number of psychological categories developed 
and refined by Pennebaker et al. (2007), including positive or 
negative emotional tone. One of the most widely used lan-
guage dictionaries in existence, LIWC has been applied suc-
cessfully in a variety of social science research (Ahmadian 
et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2015; Connor et al., 2010; Hwong 
et al., 2017). LIWC is particularly useful in our case as it 
provides equivalent versions for the English and German 
posts (Brand et al., 2003; Tumasjan et al., 2010).
Results
Our results reveal important differences across the countries 
and outlets under study. The Facebook pages of the US news 
outlets featured significantly more hostile comments 
(M = 0.66) compared to the German news outlets (M = 0.48; 
scale ranges from 0 to 1). The German comments more fre-
quently used a neutral tone (M = 0.43) compared to the 
English-language comments (M = 0.21) (Table 2). Based on 
these results, we accept Hypothesis 5, postulating that higher 
levels of audience polarization on the national level, as pres-
ent in the United States, foster hostile commenting on social 
media.
At a meso-level, we assume that mass-oriented news out-
lets feature higher levels of hostile user comments on their 
Facebook pages because of their strong market orientation 
(Hypothesis 3). In addition, the political leaning of news out-
lets is expected to drive hostility in user comments 
(Hypothesis 4). As Table 3 shows, market orientation does 
not seem to be a driver for hostile emotions in comments 
since mass-market outlets (M = 0.56) did not differ signifi-
cantly from up-market outlets (M = 0.50). However, the 
Facebook pages of alternative right-wing news outlets 
Table 1. Selection of Countries and News Outlets.
Country Type of website News outlet No. of comments No. of posts
Germany Up-market Süddeutsche Zeitung 300 145
Mass-market WAZ 300 161
Alternative right-wing Kopp Report 300  78
United States Up-market New York Times 300 352
Mass-market USA Today 300 439
Alternative right-wing media Breitbart 300 242
Table 2. Comment Type by Country.
DE US p
Hostile comment 0.48 (0.50) 0.66 (0.47) .000
Affirmative comment 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.33) .230
Neutral comment 0.43 (0.50) 0.21 (0.41) .000
Total N = 1,800. Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses.
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showed significantly more hostile comments (M = 0.64) than 
other outlets.
Differences were also found on a micro-level with regard 
to actors and target objects in user comments. As shown in 
Figure 1, commenters from both countries frequently focused 
on the US President and on immigrants. At the time of data 
collection, Donald Trump was relatively new in office and 
predominantly focused on the topic of immigration. News 
media in both countries reported intensively about his plans 
and policies.
Regarding the target objects of the comments, country 
differences were more pronounced. The commenters in the 
United States frequently targeted the US President, the polit-
ical class, and the Democratic Party. In contrast, the German 
commenters more often attacked immigrants or mentioned 
the consequences of immigration for the general public (see 
Figure 2).
To compare the relative weights of the micro-, meso-, and 
macro-levels, predictors were tested in a multivariate ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression with the hostile emo-
tions index as the outcome variable. Independent variables 
were entered in two blocks: (1) county-level, outlet-level, 
and comment-level variables and (2) interactions. Table 4 
presents the results of the two models that were tested. In the 
first model, country characteristics are positively associated 
with hostility in Facebook comments. We find that com-
ments on the Facebook pages from US-based outlets are 
more hostile (β = 0.17). However, hostile emotions in posts 
are not related to higher levels of hostile emotions, a finding 
that leads us to reject Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the meso-
level predictors of market orientation and political stance 
revealed no effects in the multivariate setting, thus rejecting 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. On the micro-level, we found signifi-
cant effects for all three actor types: media (β = 0.07, p ⩽ .01), 
immigrants (β = 0.06, p ⩽ .01), and political class (β = 0.10, 
p ⩽ .001). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 
stating that comments featuring these issues are likely to 
have a hostile tone.
In Model 2, we tested several interactions to answer our 
research question. The interaction between country and alter-
native right-wing news outlets revealed a significant, nega-
tive effect (β = −2.05, p ⩽ .001). We tested this interaction to 
examine whether the influence of political leaning increases 
in polarized environments. However, this result indicates 
that in less polarized environments, such as in Germany, 
comments on alternative right-wing Facebook pages predict 
higher levels of hostility. Furthermore, we tested interactions 
between the country and different actors mentioned in the 
user comments. We found significant, negative main effects 
for the media (β = −0.16, p ⩽ .001) and immigrants (β = −0.1, 
p ⩽ .01). Furthermore, we found a weak, positive effect of 
the prevalence of political actors in the comments (β = 0.05, 
p ⩽ .05). These results show that unless the comments on 
German Facebook pages contain lower levels of hostility 
compared to the comments on US pages, the level of hostility 
rises in polarized debates, such as on immigrants, the media, 
and on alternative right-wing pages. In other words, when 
immigrants and the media were mentioned in comments, 
hostility in the German comments increased. The same, but 
weaker, effect was found for the mention of political actors 
Table 3. Comment Type by Outlet Type
Mass-market Up-market Alternative right-wing F values
Hostile comment 0.56a 0.50a 0.64b 12.510
Affirmative comment 0.12a 0.11a 0.10a 0.456
Neutral comment 0.32a 0.39a 0.26b 11.406
Total N = 1,800. Means with different superscript letters are significantly different at the p < .001 level; means with the same superscript are not 
statistically different (based on post hoc Dunnett’s T3 test for unequal group variances at the p < .05 level).
Figure 1. Top 10 main actors per country (%).
Figure 2. Top 10 target objects per country (%).
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and increasing hostility in the US comments. The data fit 
improved to 8% of the explained variance in the comprehen-
sive Model 2.
Discussion
Going beyond the literature on individual-level factors for 
online participation, this study is one of the first to systemati-
cally test and identify organizational and system-level drivers 
for hostile emotions in online user comments on Facebook. 
The starting point of this study builds on previous research 
that examined hostile emotions in discussions on social media 
as a potential threat to democracy because of its potential to 
polarize public discourse and the absence of finding common 
ground for consensual decision-making. Although hostility in 
the form of uncivil, angry, and aggressive language is present 
in most countries, this phenomenon seems not to be driven 
purely by technology and the rise of social network sites but 
depends on contextual factors. Several authors have argued 
that characteristics of the information environment as well as 
the type of news outlet can explain the prevalence of hostile 
comments on news outlets’ Facebook pages. However, empir-
ical research examining macro- and meso-level factors is 
scarce as most previous studies focus on individual factors 
that predict commenting on news stories, or studies examine 
the types of media organizations that trigger hostile com-
ments. To fill this gap, we conducted cross-country and cross-
outlet comparisons to examine the influence of the information 
environment and the outlet type.
Generally, we find significantly higher shares of hostile 
Facebook comments in the United States compared to 
Germany. This result seems to confirm our assumption that 
polarized audiences are linked to hostility in online discus-
sions. The political communication culture of the United 
States is marked by heated electoral campaigns, including 
negative campaigning and frequent verbal attacks of political 
opponents. Recently, social media has become an important 
tool to whip up the masses in the fight for attention (Kenski 
et al., 2018). This combination seems to increase the level of 
hostile emotions in user comments.
In environments with less polarized audiences, such as in 
Germany, hostile comments occur when controversial topics are 
debated. Our analysis shows that hostile comments are more 
frequent on the alternative right-wing media Facebook pages. 
The polarized debates on the refugee crisis and the “lying 
press”—an expression referring to the news media’s positive 
reporting on refugees—seem to trigger higher numbers of hos-
tile comments in Germany than in the United States, across all 
three types of news organizations. This difference is also 
reflected in the strong personalization of comments in the 
United States, which frequently target political actors, such as 
the President. Moreover, the comments on the German alterna-
tive right-wing media Facebook page seem to be less under-
mined with opposition discourse outbalancing hostility, as 
found in Filer and Fredheim’s (2016) results. Thus, audience 
composition related to the diversity of political leaning might be 
relevant to understanding the relationship between macro- and 
meso-level characteristics. The results of this study illustrate the 
different online discussion cultures in these two countries. In the 
United States, negative social media comments are pervasive. 
In Germany, however, social media discussions are likely to 
have a hostile tone when they involve polarized topics.
Table 4. Regression Models for Predicting the Level of Hostile Emotions in Facebook Comments.
Model 1 Model 2
 B SE (B) β B SE (B) β
Constant 0.40 0.04 −1.59 0.81  
Country (US) 0.16 0.03 0.16*** 0.11 0.04 0.11**
Alternative right-wing outlet .01 0.06 0.01 −1.33 0.55 −1.27*
Mass-market outlet −0.05 0.03 −0.04 −0.16 0.06 −0.16**
Hostile emotions in posts 0.03 0.02 0.08 1.08 0.43 3.09*
Main actor media 0.19 0.06 0.07** 0.40 0.09 0.15***
Main actor immigrants 0.11 0.04 0.06** 0.28 0.05 0.17***
Main actor politics 0.31 0.07 0.10*** 0.26 0.07 0.08***
Interactions: Country × alternative 
right-wing outlet
−2.73 1.14 −2.05**
Country × main actor media −0.38 0.08 −0.16***
Country × main actor immigrants −0.35 0.12 −0.1**
Country × main actor politics 0.13 0.06 0.05*
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08
N 1,800
OLS: ordinary least squares.
OLS regressions. Entries are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and betas.
*p < .05; **p < .01; and ***p < .001.
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What role do news outlets play in regard to hostility in 
social media comments? News outlets frequently complain 
about the rising number of hostile comments on their plat-
forms (Meltzer, 2014). Hate speech, incivility, and impo-
liteness challenge media organizations in many ways. Large 
numbers of negative comments can affect the credibility of 
single outlets (Anderson et al., 2016; Prochazka et al., 
2018). Therefore, newsrooms must compile guidelines for 
the moderation of user comments and implement them 
without repelling (too many) users (Ziegele & Jost, 2016). 
However, although media actors complain about hostile 
emotions in comment sections, some outlets accept and 
even provoke them (Lengauer et al., 2011; Muddiman & 
Stroud, 2017). Those news outlets benefit from outrageous 
and uncivil discourses because they trigger attention—thus 
increasing advertising revenue. Our results do not show a 
direct relationship between hostile emotions in posts and in 
comments, but the editorial orientation of news outlets 
seem to influence the discourse in comment sections. 
Alternative right-wing news outlets are pioneers in this 
area: their content is supposed to fuel polarized debates and 
outrages that attract attention and thus become lucrative 
(Heft et al., 2019; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). The results 
of our study confirm this logic: Facebook pages of alterna-
tive right-wing news outlets contain significantly higher 
numbers of hostile comments. However, when considering 
the macro-level of the media system and the micro-level of 
the content, the meso-level of political stance has no pre-
dictive power. That is, alternative right-wing news outlets 
post more content that triggers hostile comments than up-
market and mass-market news outlets but the alternative 
right-wing outlets do not cause greater hostility per se.
The question remains whether hostility in online discus-
sion fosters political and societal polarization, or whether it 
is a result of such phenomena which manifest in audience 
polarization. Our study does not ultimately answer this ques-
tion. However, one interpretation of our results is that the 
relationship between user comments and audience polariza-
tion is a reinforcing spiral (Cheng et al., 2017). Where politi-
cal actors continuously attack their opponents and alienate 
their supporters against each other, deliberation and consen-
sus-driven discourse becomes difficult. The result is split 
societies with citizens who barely share common values and 
avoid talking to each other in a rational way.
Naturally, this study has several limitations, most of 
which stem from its limited sample. First, we only com-
pared two countries. To fully examine the importance of 
macro-level factors for the prevalence of hostile emotions 
on Facebook, a larger set of countries is needed. Future 
research may select larger sets of countries to explore fur-
ther macro-level factors, such as trust in politics and national 
discussion cultures. Moreover, to sample functional equiva-
lents, only three news outlets per country were sampled. 
Thus, the results do not reflect the entire variety of political 
online discussions related to news content in both countries. 
Furthermore, this study quantitatively examines hostility in 
user comments. To better understand in which ways politi-
cal online discourses differ across countries and news out-
lets, qualitative studies are needed. They are able to identify 
the patterns of argumentations used by commenters in dif-
ferent environments. Moreover, a qualitative look at heavy 
commenters is another important future avenue for research 
as those actors presumably shape online discourse by setting 
important frames.
Conclusion
Comparing hostility on social media across news outlets and 
media systems, this study reveals that comparing contexts of 
use is relevant when analyzing interdependencies between 
society and novel technology in line with the social informat-
ics perspective. While incivility and hostility have been 
described as a phenomenon related to hyper-partisan and 
alternative right-wing news outlets, hostile comments occur 
with polarizing topics in politically polarized systems. 
Benkler et al. (2017) argue that those news outlets are “com-
bining decontextualized truths, repeated falsehoods, and 
leaps of logic to create fundamentally misleading views of 
the world.” By addressing polarizing actors and issues and 
by framing them in an ideological way, alternative right-
wing outlets provoke a large number of hostile comments. 
Moreover, mass-market outlets may copy this successful 
strategy for profit motives and thus also contribute to increas-
ing hostility and pollution of the social media public sphere. 
Overall, our study shows that hostility in Facebook news 
comments is not solely a technology-driven phenomenon but 
is driven by structural factors of the information environ-
ment and the news organization. Certain types of news out-
lets strategically provoke hostile comments on their Facebook 
pages, however, these patterns differ across the two countries 
examined in this study. These results have implications for 
the discussion of the nature and the causes of increasing hos-
tility on social media. The existing research on the effects of 
hostile emotions in user comments indicates important impli-
cations for individuals. Some authors argue that those dis-
courses increase political intolerance and decrease trust in 
politics and the news media (Muddiman & Stroud, 2017; 
Stroud et al., 2015). Other authors see potential for greater 
attention to public affairs and increased levels of political 
participation caused by politicized, polarized online debates 
(Molina & Jennings, 2017; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Whether 
predominantly hostile online discourses are corrosive or con-
structive to the health of democracy will remain an important 
question for future research. Moreover, new online platforms 
and greater self-selectivity are questioning traditional ideas 
of deliberation and the public sphere in democratic societies. 
When established media brands lose hold of their audiences, 
sharing a common stock of political knowledge is impeded. 
In such an environment, citizens are hardly required to think 
about the concerns and ideas of their political opponents, 
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thereby immersing themselves in a media world filled with 
voices that share and bolster their existing perspectives with-
out challenging them (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Our work 
deepens the understanding of the drivers of hostile emotions 
in online discussions and will hopefully provide guidance for 
future research in the field of social media discussions.
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